Ruling upholds six-month suspension and order to pay compensation and costs
The New Zealand Supreme Court has declined leave to appeal sought by a solicitor who was suspended for six months after he accused a law firm partner of lying under oath and posted his allegations on a website he had made.
The case was Jindal v Auckland Standards Committee 1 [2026] NZSC 156.
In February 2020, while a law student, the applicant asked for legal advice from Mr Y, a firm partner. On a phone call with the applicant, Mr Y said his firm would charge the applicant under its regular engagement terms.
After the applicant failed to pay its bill for $999.81, the firm initiated a debt proceeding against him.
At trial, the applicant represented himself as he had earned admission as a barrister and solicitor by then. Mr Y’s evidence addressed the phone call. On the other hand, the applicant denied that the call had occurred and dubbed Mr Y a liar.
The District Court of New Zealand ruled in the firm’s favour. The applicant appealed.
In a document delivered to the firm, the applicant stated that Mr Y lied under oath. He had similar documents put in Mr Y’s and his neighbours’ letterboxes. He also tried to prosecute Mr Y for perjury.
Ultimately, the applicant and the firm settled the debt matter.
After Mr Y filed a complaint with the New Zealand Law Society, an Auckland Standards Committee charged the applicant with misconduct.
In 2024, the New Zealand Lawyers and Conveyancers Disciplinary Tribunal found the applicant guilty of misconduct under s 7 of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 (LCA).
In 2025, the tribunal censured the applicant, set a six-month suspension, and made him pay compensation and costs.
In the High Court, the applicant appealed from the liability and penalty findings. In 2025, the High Court dismissed his appeal.
Before the High Court and the Court of Appeal, the applicant failed to obtain leave for a second appeal. The two courts issued orders staying his suspension while he exercised his appeal rights.
Before the Supreme Court, the applicant applied for leave to appeal against the High Court’s substantive decision and the appeal court’s leave decision. The applicant also requested an extension of time.
The Supreme Court approved an extension of time for the applicant to seek leave to appeal from the High Court ruling because the applicant had timely applied for leave to appeal after the delivery of the Court of Appeal decision.
The Supreme Court acknowledged that the proper interpretation of s 7 of the LCA and the approach to the difference between professional and personal conduct might be matters of general or public importance.
However, the Supreme Court did not deem it appropriate to grant leave to appeal to tackle those matters.
First, the Supreme Court ruled that the applicant failed to advance his proposed interpretative arguments, primarily concerning the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, before the tribunal or the High Court. The Supreme Court noted that it would have impacted its assessment.
Second, the Supreme Court did not find enough prospects of success in this aspect of the proposed appeal. The Supreme Court rejected as untenable the applicant’s argument that a residual category beyond both s 7(1)(a) and (b)(ii) of the LCA covered his conduct.
“To exclude the applicant’s conduct from s 7 would undermine the regulatory regime established by the LCA and run counter to the Act’s purpose of maintaining public confidence in the provision of legal services and protecting consumers of those services,” the Supreme Court wrote.
Upon classifying the applicant’s conduct as personal, the Supreme Court discerned no error in the findings below that the case satisfied the heightened threshold for personal misconduct.
Next, regarding the challenge against penalty, the Supreme Court accepted that the application of the Bill of Rights to the issuance of an LCA penalty could be a matter of general or public importance.
However, the Supreme Court again noted that the applicant failed to raise the Bill of Rights arguments before the tribunal or the High Court.
The Supreme Court also pointed out that the tribunal and the High Court considered the applicant’s right to free expression in their fact-specific penalty assessments.
The Supreme Court saw no prospect of a finding that the penalty was disproportionately severe, no apparent miscarriage of justice, and no exceptional circumstances warranting the grant of leave to appeal directly from the High Court.
The Supreme Court further stayed the order suspending the applicant from practice until 6 p.m. on 30 October 2026. According to the Supreme Court, the suspension sought to afford the applicant the time to make the proper practice arrangements.
Lastly, the Supreme Court ordered the applicant to pay the respondent $4,850 in costs.
On 24 June 2026, the Supreme Court of New Zealand granted a short further continuation of a stay of the order imposing a six-month suspension on the applicant under ss 242(1)(e) and 244 of the LCA.
Before that, the Court of Appeal of New Zealand denied leave to appeal against a ruling of the High Court of New Zealand that affirmed the Lawyers and Conveyancers Disciplinary Tribunal’s liability and penalty decisions.
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