A platform cannot be two service categories at once, so only one instrument applies
The Federal Court freed X Corp from a second online safety standard, finding that a social media platform cannot also be a messaging service.
In X Corp v eSafety Commissioner [2026] FCA 1123, the court decided whether X Corp had to comply with the Online Safety (Relevant Electronic Services – Class 1A and Class 1B Material) Industry Standard 2024 (Cth) (the RES Standard).
X Corp asked the court to declare, under s. 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), that the RES Standard did not apply to the X Platform. Both sides agreed that the platform was a "social media service" under ss. 5 and 13 of the Online Safety Act 2021 (Cth) (the Act), which placed it under the Social Media Services Online Safety Code (the SMS Code).
The eSafety Commissioner argued that the Act did not stop a service from falling into more than one category, so the platform could also be a "relevant electronic service" under s. 13A and be caught by the RES Standard. The court noted that the RES Standard said it applied "to the exclusion of any industry code," which would have displaced the SMS Code.
The court disagreed. It found that the Act created separate, distinct categories of service, and that the wording pointed to a single classification rather than two. The court said that s. 13 was built to prevent a double classification through its "sole or primary purpose" test, while s. 14 expressly kept a social media service and a relevant electronic service out of the definition of a "designated internet service."
The court held that the Act's structure supported that reading. It noted that the law limited the Commissioner's power to make a standard under s. 145, favoured industry codes over standards and, in s. 150, dealt only with clashes between a code and a standard, not between two codes or two standards. Treating the categories as overlapping, the court found, would leave providers with unclear and possibly conflicting obligations.
The court also rejected the Commissioner's concern that this reading would let providers "self-select" their obligations. It said that a provider could not self-select, because the Act defined the sections of the industry and the correct classification was an objective question, not a choice.
The court allowed X Corp's application and declared that the RES Standard did not apply to X Corp in relation to its provision of X. Because X Corp did not seek costs, the court made no order as to costs.
