Court finds no risk of substantial miscarriage of justice arising from jury directions and evidence
The Supreme Court of New Zealand has dismissed an application for leave to appeal against seven sexual offending convictions, finding no risk of substantial miscarriage of justice arising from allegedly prejudicial evidence, jury directions, or the conduct of jury deliberations.
In Duffy v R [2026] NZSC 151, the court considered challenges to convictions involving allegations of sexual offending between 1987 and 1993, beginning when the complainant was about seven years old.
The complainant first reported the allegations to police in 1999, but authorities took no further action after the accused denied responsibility. She complained again in 2020 following online publicity concerning his earlier sexual offending against another young woman, for which he had been imprisoned in 1995.
In September 2024, a jury convicted the accused of three counts of unlawful sexual connection, three counts of rape, and one count involving an indecent act. He received an eight-year prison sentence and unsuccessfully appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeal.
The applicant sought Supreme Court leave on three grounds. First, he argued that the complainant's references to his previous imprisonment and a Facebook group involving property eviction complaints prejudiced jurors and encouraged independent research.
The Supreme Court found no error in the Court of Appeal's conclusion that the evidence did not create a heightened risk of independent juror research or cause a miscarriage of justice. It noted that no evidence suggested any juror had breached their oath by researching the case.
The court also noted that the complainant and trial judge had clarified that the Facebook group had no connection to sexual abuse allegations.
Second, the applicant challenged directions concerning misconceptions about inconsistencies and delayed complaints. The court considered its judgments in MB v R [2026] NZSC 76 and TW v R [2026] NZSC 77, but found that the trial judge's substantive directions did not improperly connect those misconceptions to the complainant's evidence.
Third, the applicant argued that a combined Papadopoulos–majority verdict direction placed illegitimate pressure on jurors. The court found no error in the Court of Appeal's conclusion that the direction did not cause a miscarriage of justice, noting that jurors had already turned their minds to majority verdicts before receiving it.
The court also accepted the Crown's submission that the question of miscarriage arising from cumulative errors did not arise, even assuming the issue was of general importance. It concluded that the interests of justice did not require it to hear or determine the proposed appeal and dismissed the application for leave.
