Appeal ruling describes case as ‘salutary lesson in the pitfalls in using AI absent legal skills’
In an administrative proceeding involving the Land Act 1994 (Qld), a judge of the Queensland Supreme Court’s Court of Appeal characterised a local cricket club’s case as “a salutary lesson in the pitfalls in using AI absent legal skills.”
In Beechmont Cricket Club Inc v Scenic Rim Regional Council [2026] QCA 187, the applicant was a cricket club. Alongside members of the public, the club used Graceleigh Park at Beechmont, Scenic Rim Region, Queensland.
According to a 2010 land management plan, the park was part of a reserve that primarily aimed to provide a park and recreational area.
The first respondent was a regional council and trustee of the reserve land. The second respondent was the Beechmont Recreation, Arts, and Sports Association (BRASA).
Under a management agreement with the council dated 10 August 1990, BRASA managed the park and facilitated its use for various sporting activities and family-friendly areas.
Appearing on the cricket club’s behalf with the court’s leave, its president alleged that the club could not retain legal representation and had concerns about the grant of a trustee lease without compliance with the land management plan.
At the council’s general meeting on 26 November 2025, a tabled proposal in item 11.8 of the meeting agenda asked the council to consider executing a five-year trustee lease agreement with BRASA for the park.
Per the proposed trustee lease, the current and proposed uses aligned with the reserve’s purpose, and a land management plan was unnecessary under the Land Act. Section 57 of the Land Act provided for leasing trust land if the trustee first obtained ministerial approval.
On 26 November 2025, the cricket club applied for a statutory order of review against the respondents under s 22 of the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) (JRA).
The club contended that the council failed to decide whether there was compliance with the statutory conditions for granting a trustee lease over the park, specifically under ss 57(3) and 57(6) of the Land Act.
The president acknowledged the use of a generative artificial intelligence (AI) tool to formulate the club’s argument.
Under s 48 of the JRA, the council applied for the summary disposal of the review application.
On 31 March 2026, Justice Muir summarily dismissed the review application and ordered the cricket club to pay indemnity costs. Justice Muir found no failure to make the decision reviewable under the JRA and no reasonable basis for the review application.
The cricket club applied for leave to appeal to challenge the summary dismissal and the costs order.
Justice Brown of the Queensland Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal. The judge ordered the club to pay the respondents’ standard application costs.
In connection with the cricket club’s utilisation of AI without legal skills, Justice Brown wrote, “While the product may sound convincing it may, as in this case, present an entirely flawed argument.”
Justice Brown considered Justice Muir’s decision plainly correct.
According to Justice Brown, the council had no duty to determine whether there was compliance with s 57 and the other statutory conditions for trustee leasing of the reserve land under the Land Act until it decided to grant a trustee lease covered by s 57(6).
Justice Brown noted that the council did not yet determine whether to grant a trustee lease and did not need to do so.
Justice Brown saw no arguable error in Justice Muir’s findings that the review application had no reasonable basis and that continuing the proceedings would be inappropriate.
Justice Brown also found no substantial injustice in denying leave, no basis to justify granting leave, and no justification for joining BRASA, notwithstanding its being the proposed lessee of a potential trustee lease.
Justice Brown rejected the applicant cricket club’s assertions of a lack of procedural fairness or the absence of a fair and practical opportunity to complete submissions on s 57 or to reply regarding BRASA’s status as an appropriate respondent.
Upon reviewing the applicant cricket club’s written submissions, Justice Bond of the Queensland Court of Appeal did not find the hallucinations, confabulations, or misleading factual statements typically seen in self-represented litigants’ submissions assisted by generative AI tools.
However, Justice Bond held that the club failed to grapple with a critical point and made misconceived forays into litigation in the trial and appeal levels, leading to two failed applications and two sets of adverse costs orders.
“Whether the applicant’s decision to litigate in the manner it did was due to its reliance on advice obtained from a Gen AI tool is unclear,” Justice Bond wrote. “But if it was, then that choice was regrettable.”
Here are some other recent decisions by the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland.
On 27 April 2026, the appeal court found no error in the chief justice’s summary dismissal of a judicial review application that sought to prosecute the police officers who were the complainants in the applicant’s trial.
In a case involving the long-term guardianship of three children, the appeal court issued a 17 February 2026 decision agreeing with a submission by the director of child protection litigation and the children’s representative that it lacked the jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
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