Federal Court disallows director from acting for insurance company in competition case

Judge declines to dispense with requirement for lawyer to represent corporation

Federal Court disallows director from acting for insurance company in competition case
Law Courts, Sydney

In a competition law proceeding, Australia’s Federal Court dismissed an interlocutory application aimed at allowing a director to represent an insurance company, rather than a lawyer as required by r 4.01(2) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). 

Dynamic Insurance Services Pty Ltd and its sole director – the applicants in Dynamic Insurance Services Pty Ltd v Steadfast Group Limited [2026] FCA 964 – filed an originating application seeking declarations, damages, interest, other relief, and costs against the three respondents within the insurance industry. 

Specifically, the applicants alleged anti-competitive agreements, misuse of market power, exclusive dealing in breach of ss 45, 46, and 47 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), and statutory unconscionable conduct in violation of s 21 of the Australian Consumer Law and s 12CB of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth). 

Interlocutory application filed

In their originating application, the applicants also requested an interlocutory order dispensing with compliance with the requirement under r 4.01(2) that a lawyer represent a corporation in court proceedings. 

The applicants wanted the director to act on behalf of Dynamic Insurance. The director alleged that representing the insurance company would be more efficient, cost-effective, and proportionate. She added that she was familiar with the facts and issues involved. 

All respondents opposed the requested interlocutory order. 

Federal Court denies interlocutory application

The Federal Court of Australia dismissed the interlocutory application, which had asked the court to dispense with the r 4.01(2) requirement that a lawyer represent Dynamic Insurance in the proceeding and to permit the director to represent it instead. 

In the circumstances, the court found no reason to depart from the requirement for a lawyer to represent the corporate applicant. Rather, the court saw good reasons to retain the requirement. 

The court ordered the applicants to pay the respondents the interlocutory application costs, subject to tax. 

Director’s suitability to represent corporation

The Federal Court acknowledged that it did not doubt the director’s skill, competence, and experience in conducting Dynamic Insurance’s business. 

However, the court held that allowing the director, as a non-lawyer, to represent the insurance company would not serve its best interests. The court noted that the director: 

  • was a separate applicant who opted to represent herself under r 4.01(1) of the Federal Court Rules 
  • did not assert that retaining the r 4.01(2) requirement would hinder access to justice, given that she submitted that she had the financial capacity to engage lawyers and could support Dynamic Insurance via a loan 
  • would inevitably encounter difficulties pleading and articulating sustainable causes of action, which would likely cause delay, increased cost, and inefficient conduct of the proceeding 
  • might not be able to maintain the objectivity and independence needed to represent Dynamic Insurance or to instruct expert witnesses in a manner that preserved their independence 

As Justice Michael James Feutrill wrote, “an absence of objectivity and independence risks the applicants wishing ‘to chase every rabbit down its burrow’ irrespective of merit leading to prolongation, increased cost and inefficiency in the resolution of disputes that can be avoided by lawyers discharging their paramount duty to the Court.” 

Complexity of issues

The Federal Court pointed out that the proceeding involved complex competition law matters and statutory unconscionable conduct, which was not a factually or legally straightforward claim. 

The court saw apparent deficiencies in the applicants’ statement of claim that the respondents could likely raise or exploit. 

The court found it difficult to accept that the applicants could support their arguments without calling the director as a witness or could prove their claims under ss 45, 46, and 47 of the Competition and Consumer Act without expert evidence. 

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