Permission also engages approach to resumption requirements in Treaty of Waitangi Act
The New Zealand Supreme Court has granted leave to appeal on the lower court’s approach to the resumption requirements in s 8HB of the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 and the Waitangi Tribunal’s discretion to award Crown Forest Assets Act 1989 (CFAA) compensation.
In a series of decisions, the tribunal and the courts addressed the interpretation and application of the resumption provisions in the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 (TOWA).
One issue concerned the interest on the compensation amount in the event of the election of the clause 3(c) option in the CFAA. The tribunal refused to extend the applicable four-year period, except to consider delays arising from the COVID‑19 lockdowns.
On judicial review, the High Court determined that the tribunal erroneously approached the causes of delay and ordered it to reconsider its recommendations relevant to this issue.
On 13 November 2025, in Estate of Ruru v Attorney-General [2025] NZCA 597, the Court of Appeal of New Zealand awarded compensation in recognition of the land’s return, subject to the forestry licences.
The appeal court determined that the Waitangi Tribunal should examine the extent of the resumption recipient’s entitlement to benefit from the Crown-developed forest on land that Māori rightfully owned.
The appeal court ruled that the High Court of New Zealand appropriately found that the tribunal erred in its approach to the interest award.
The appeal court explained that interest ran on the compensation to a successful claimant at a rate that maintained the award’s real value, and then rose to an amount reflecting a commercial return.
The appeal court added that the Crown could only extend the lower rate period if the delay exceeded its control and arose despite its best efforts to resolve the resumption claims with Māori in the briefest reasonable time.
The appeal court held that the tribunal failed to follow this approach, failed to tackle the necessary lines of inquiry, and failed to address numerous reasons for the delay in determining the resumption applications that were apparently not due to the Crown’s default.
The first and second applicants applied for leave to appeal against the appeal court’s judgment. They alleged that the appeal court committed errors in its approach to:
On 10 June 2026, in Estate of Ruru v Attorney-General [2026] NZSC 79, the Supreme Court of New Zealand granted leave to appeal and approved the questions of whether the Court of Appeal erred in its approach to:
Otherwise, the Supreme Court denied the application for leave to appeal, specifically in connection with the third ground. The Supreme Court saw insufficient prospects of success to warrant leave.
Regarding the third ground, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the issue was commercially significant because the initial rate, without any extension, was lower than the payable rate after the four‑year period’s expiry.
The Supreme Court recognised the very long period of delay while the tribunal completed its recommendations.
The Supreme Court found that the High Court and Court of Appeal followed the approach to the issue in Wairarapa Moana Ki Pouākani Inc v Mercury NZ Ltd [2022] NZSC 142, a recent judgment that was not relevantly distinguishable.
