Supreme Court denies leave to appeal of lawyer subject to suspension

He faced charges before Lawyers and Conveyancers Disciplinary Tribunal

Supreme Court denies leave to appeal of lawyer subject to suspension
Supreme Court of New Zealand

Upon seeing insufficient prospects of success, New Zealand’s Supreme Court dismissed an application for leave to appeal brought by a lawyer subject to three sets of professional disciplinary charges before the New Zealand Lawyers and Conveyancers Disciplinary Tribunal from 2010–15. 

The applicant in Deliu v New Zealand Lawyers and Conveyancers Disciplinary Tribunal and Anor [2025] NZSC 177, appealed unsuccessfully against some of the tribunal’s procedural steps and decisions in 2015. The High Court ruled that it had no jurisdiction over these matters. 

In 2016, the High Court heard the disciplinary charges and suspended the applicant. In 2017, the applicant appealed and freshly applied for judicial review. The High Court dismissed the appeal and the judicial review application. 

In 2018, the High Court denied the applicant’s application seeking leave to appeal against the decision dismissing his appeal. Meanwhile, his appeal against the decision declining judicial review was deemed abandoned because he failed to pay security for the appeal costs. 

In 2021, the applicant again applied for judicial review, allegedly because his earlier suspension from legal practice would hinder his application for admission to practise law in Florida, US. He raised matters regarding the tribunal’s constitution and manner of determining the case. 

In 2023, the High Court dismissed the judicial review application. It held that: 

  • The judicial review application abused the judicial process 
  • The applicant’s prior proceedings could and should have raised all these issues 
  • Proceeding with the matter would not serve the interests of justice 
  • The tribunal had properly appointed the lawyer and lay members 

In 2025, New Zealand’s Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal of the High Court decision. Declining to address the merits, the appeal court explained that devoting more judicial resources to determining the merits would not serve the public interest. 

The appeal court found that: 

  • The 2017 proceedings could and should have pursued the matters raised in the 2021 judicial review application 
  • Finalising the litigation would support the public interest, given the prior proceeding’s comprehensive nature, the resources involved in that proceeding, and the delay 
  • The 2021 proceeding was attempting to undermine the appeal regime, as it was effectively challenging the 2017 High Court ruling affirming the tribunal’s decision and penalty 
  • The de facto officer doctrine would apply to prevent collateral challenges based on unknown flaws or defects in the appointment process in the event of invalid appointments of the tribunal members 

The applicant applied for leave to appeal the appeal court’s decision. In his proposed appeal, the applicant argued that the appeal court: 

  • should have tackled the merits through the exercise contemplated in Henderson v Henderson [1843] EngR 917; (1843) 3 Hare 100, 67 ER 313 (Ch) 
  • placed him in a bad light by failing to undertake this broad exercise or address his side of the story 
  • breached natural justice 

Leave denied

The Supreme Court of New Zealand dismissed the application seeking leave to appeal and declined to order costs. 

The Supreme Court saw no question of general or public importance or appearance of a miscarriage of justice in the civil context in the proposed appeal. The Supreme Court ruled that the appeal court did not need to examine the merits fully to find an abuse of process. 

The Supreme Court held that subjecting the respondents to further litigation would abuse the process, given the applicant’s prior opportunities to raise the matters asserted in the proposed appeal, the applicant’s receiving his day in court, and the delay involved.