Three proceedings arose from alleged losses due to law firm collapse
In a case arising from an action against the New Zealand Law Society and an insurer, the Supreme Court refused to extend the time to apply for leave to appeal three proceedings against an applicant’s former lawyers and litigation guardian.
In Erwood v Minchin, [2025] NZSC 122, the applicant filed an action against the New Zealand Law Society and an insurance company. He alleged losses due to the collapse of law firm Renshaw Edwards in 1992.
The fourth respondent in this case – instructed by Glasgow Harley, the third respondent – acted for the applicant in these proceedings.
In 2002, the applicant initiated proceedings against the fourth respondent and Glasgow Harley. He asserted negligence in their litigation conduct.
New Zealand’s High Court appointed the first respondent, a lawyer, as the applicant’s litigation guardian. The first respondent asked the fifth respondent, a solicitor, to instruct the second respondent (presently deceased) as counsel.
In October 2003, a psychiatrist assessed the applicant and reported that he had no mental disorder and no longer required a litigation guardian.
In November 2003, the second respondent attended a judicial settlement conference alongside the first respondent and did not notify the court of the psychiatrist’s report. The proceedings settled, with Justice Frater issuing consent orders.
In January 2004, the applicant brought parallel proceedings to recall the consent orders and remove the first respondent as litigation guardian.
In December 2005, the High Court refused to set aside the consent orders. The court found that the first respondent was authorized to settle the applicant’s litigation, given that their appointment as litigation guardian continued until its termination.
The applicant tried to appeal out of time. New Zealand’s Court of Appeal denied special leave to appeal. The applicant applied to recall that judgment. In 2008, the appeal court rejected that application. In April 2009, the applicant applied to recall the 2008 recall judgment.
In December 2004, the applicant brought proceedings against the fifth respondent. He added the second respondent as a defendant in 2006 and the first respondent as a defendant in 2011.
In August 2019, Justice Downs of the High Court held that the first and fifth respondents were not negligent. In November 2019, Justice Palmer of the High Court denied the applicant’s claims against the second respondent.
The court deemed the applicant’s appeal against Justice Downs’ decision abandoned in November 2020.
In December 2024, the appeal court dismissed the applicant’s application to recall the 2008 recall judgment, his application to extend the time to appeal Downs’ August 2019 judgment, and his application to extend the time to appeal Palmer’s November 2019 decision.
The applicant brought a notice of appeal on 14 February 2025 out of time, given that he should have filed it by 10 February 2025. He alleged that he received the appeal court’s December 2024 judgment by post in January 2025.
The applicant applied for an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal the appeal court’s December 2024 judgment.
The Supreme Court of New Zealand dismissed the application for an extension of time upon finding no merit in the application for leave to appeal. The Supreme Court ordered the applicant to pay the first respondent $500 in costs.
Regarding the appeal court’s refusal to recall its 2008 recall decision, the Supreme Court ruled that it lacked the jurisdiction to hear appeals against leave or special leave decisions and applications to recall such decisions.
The Supreme Court added that this case did not meet the leave criteria.
Regarding the appeal court’s refusal to grant extensions of time to appeal the two 2019 High Court decisions, the Supreme Court saw no point of general or public importance and no risk of a miscarriage of justice, especially given the underlying proceedings’ historical nature.
The Supreme Court concluded that the appeal court applied the standard principles for extensions of time.
