Court finds one location principle has clear limits in post-award disputes
The High Court on 27 February 2026 ruled that an arbitrator lacked jurisdiction over a new dispute that arose after his awards.
In Galbraith v Global Metal Solutions Limited [2026] NZHC 382, Justice Tahana determined whether arbitrator Royden Hindle retained jurisdiction to hear a drainage dispute that emerged after he had issued two partial awards and a costs award in a commercial lease dispute.
The case arose from a lease between Hunua Holdings Trust (Hunua), the landlord, and Global Metal Solutions Ltd (GMS), a metal recycling company. The parties entered an agreement to lease in September 2019 and executed a deed of lease in September 2023. The lease included an arbitration clause requiring that disputes unresolved within 30 working days be submitted to arbitration.
In August 2021, the parties appointed Hindle as arbitrator. Their appointment agreement provided that the parties would identify the matters in dispute in a schedule, but they never completed that schedule. They instead filed pleadings, and Hindle determined the disputes those pleadings defined.
Hindle issued a first partial award in August 2023. He found that GMS had misrepresented to Hunua that its metal recycling operations required no land use consent, and that this misrepresentation induced Hunua to enter into the lease. He also found that Hunua had not acted reasonably in relying solely on GMS's assertions, and he dismissed Hunua's application to cancel the lease.
In December 2024, Hindle issued a second partial award. He dismissed GMS's counterclaim that Hunua breached its obligations by failing to construct an adequate drainage system, and declared that Hunua is not liable for the costs of any drainage upgrade. He granted conditional relief against cancellation, on condition that GMS diligently pursue and keep Hunua informed regarding its application for a land use consent. He reserved leave: to GMS, to apply for a variation of the disclosure condition should Hunua achieve affected-party status in the consent process or otherwise become a counterparty to GMS in any litigation about it; and to Hunua, to apply for reconsideration should it consider GMS was failing to diligently pursue its application and/or keep Hunua informed. A costs award followed in August 2025.
That same month, GMS obtained a land use consent. A new dispute then emerged: whether GMS could, without Hunua's consent, dig up Hunua's land to convert the drainage system as the resource consent required. Hindle ruled in September 2025 that he held jurisdiction to determine that dispute.
Hunua applied to the High Court under the Arbitration Act 1996 for a declaration that Hindle had no jurisdiction to determine any matters relevant or incidental to the matters already finally determined, which Hunua submitted included the new dispute, or any issues arising between the parties during the remainder of the lease.
Justice Tahana reviewed the matter afresh. She concluded that, because the parties left the schedule to the appointment agreement blank, the court had to imply the scope of the reference from the parties' objective intentions. Applying the framework from Bathurst Resources Ltd v L & M Coal Holdings Ltd and the implied terms conditions from BP Refinery, she held that the parties intended the pleadings to define the disputes.
She rejected GMS's argument that the "one stop shop" principle and business efficacy supported jurisdiction over related disputes arising after the awards. She found that implying such a term would create significant uncertainty and undermine each party's right under the arbitration clause to disagree with a proposed arbitrator, a concern reinforced by the clause's requirement that disputes pass through a prescribed timeframe before being referred to arbitration at all.
Justice Tahana also rejected GMS's alternative argument that the drainage consent dispute fell within Hindle's supervisory jurisdiction over the conditional relief he granted. The reserved leave in the second partial award was clearly defined and limited to specific circumstances; it did not extend to disputes arising after GMS obtained its land use consent.
Agreeing with GMS, Justice Tahana declined to make a blanket declaration in relation to undefined future disputes. She declared that Hindle had no jurisdiction to determine the Drainage Consent dispute.
