Law firm questions whether party’s son should keep representing him
The South Australian Supreme Court’s Court of Appeal rejected a law firm’s argument that it should consider the role and conduct of the applicant’s son and litigation guardian when determining whether to order standard or indemnity costs.
In Lauro v Minter Ellison (A Firm) (No 2) [2025] SASCA 131, the underlying dispute involved the taxation of the legal fees of the respondent law firm, which had previously represented the applicant.
The applicant applied for the disqualification of the present coram’s members from sitting, as well as leave to appeal a General Division judge’s decision. On 9 October 2025, the appeal court dismissed the applications.
The law firm asked for the costs of the applications on either an indemnity basis or a standard basis. The applicant, through his son and litigation guardian, opposed a cost award on any basis. In response, the law firm questioned whether the son should continue representing the applicant.
The Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of South Australia ordered the applicant to pay the respondent law firm’s costs on the standard basis.
Despite recognising the applications’ lack of merit, the appeal court deemed it inappropriate to award indemnity costs in the circumstances. It noted that an indemnity costs order usually required a demonstration that the court would have considered the case hopeless upon properly addressing it.
On the question of whether the applicant’s son should continue acting on his behalf, the appeal court rejected the law firm’s claim that it should consider the son’s role and conduct of the proceedings when determining the indemnity cost application.
The appeal court pointed out that the law firm did not object to the son’s role as a litigation guardian or lay advocate prior to the determination of the matter.
The appeal court explained that the law firm’s submissions appeared to conflate the following:
Without the law firm’s objection, the appeal court said it had insufficient information to appropriately tackle these matters via a cost application.
The appeal court acknowledged the rising number of cases involving unrepresented litigants, a significant proportion of which alleged bias to object to judges sitting. However, the appeal court did not deem this a significant factor in determining the cost application.
The appeal court saw no basis for the arguments regarding unfair benefit, misconduct, or unreasonable conduct.
The appeal court refused to delay the cost determination for an indeterminate period to accommodate the son’s desire to seek legal advice.
