Testator’s daughter pursues commencement of claim under Property (Relationships) Act
New Zealand’s Supreme Court recently ruled against an applicant who sought an order under the Administration Act 1969 and probate granted to the Public Trust, which the applicant wanted to bring a claim under the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 (PRA).
In Lane v Goldson, [2025] NZSC 87, the applicant’s mother had a relationship with the testator, started living with him in an Auckland property in 1982, and told the applicant that he was her father.
The testator transferred a half-share in the Auckland property to his then-partner in 1983, regained the share upon their separation in 1992, and bestowed her with a mortgage instead.
In 1993, the testator commenced a committed de facto relationship with a new partner. This couple had a son born in 1995 and kept separate residences, with the testator’s partner acting as the primary income earner.
The applicant’s mother died in 2011. The applicant contested her mother’s will and accepted around $3m to $4m from the estate.
The testator’s will dated 3 December 2015 left his artwork and other chattels to his current partner, bequeathed $5,000 to the applicant as his “daughter,” and transferred the residuary estate to the Aldebaran Trust, settled that day.
The Aldebaran Trust’s trustees were the testator, his partner, and her brother, while its beneficiaries were the testator, his partner, and their son.
The testator transferred the Auckland property to the Aldebaran Trust’s trustees in January 2016. He became unwell that same year and ceased working two years later due to his poor health.
The testator’s partner and their son moved into the Auckland property to care for him. She managed his finances, shelled out about $500,000 for remedial work on the house, paid most of his outgoings, and hired a live‑in carer for him in 2020.
The trustees wound up the Aldebaran Trust and distributed the property to the testator’s partner in September 2020. From late 2020 until his death in February 2022, the testator was in full‑time care in a secure dementia unit, with his partner paying for the costs.
In her application for an order under s 19(1) of the Administration Act, the applicant wanted:
The New Zealand High Court dismissed the application. It considered s 19 an inappropriate vehicle for the applicant’s requested relief, given the administration’s lawful conclusion. The court noted that the Public Trust would not necessarily receive leave to bring a PRA claim.
The New Zealand Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal. The appeal court saw no basis to remove the executors unless the estate had a credible PRA claim against the testator’s partner.
The appeal court explained that the Public Trust should meet the test in s 88(2) of the PRA to bring a PRA claim.
That subsection provided that a personal representative could apply for an order under s 25(1)(a) to determine the relationship property’s shares or divide those shares, and that the court could grant leave if refusing leave would lead to serious injustice.
The appeal court noted that the applicant failed to give evidence of financial need, moral duty breaches, or other special circumstances.
The appeal court found no windfall on the part of the testator’s partner, who had served as the primary earner in a long relationship and devoted significant funds to the Auckland property and her deceased partner’s care.
The applicant applied for leave to appeal the Court of Appeal’s unfavourable decision. The Supreme Court of New Zealand dismissed the application and ordered the applicant to pay the executors one set of costs of $2,500.
As the Supreme Court noted, the appeal court found that the appropriate approach to s 88(2) would be to determine whether the applicant’s claim was credible and meritorious, not whether the applicant could suffer serious injustice.
The Supreme Court accepted that it could consider the correct approach to s 88(2) claims in the future. However, the Supreme Court did not perceive the present case as an appropriate vehicle for that consideration.
The Supreme Court noted that the applicant did not meet the criteria for leave to appeal, challenge the appeal court’s assessment of the case’s possible merits, or assail the principles provided in Public Trust v Whyman, [2004] NZCA 327.
