Ruling notes proposed new evidence will not necessarily settle arson issue
In an insurance proceeding, New Zealand’s Supreme Court rejected an application seeking permission to appeal and determined that the applicants’ proposed new evidence would at most suggest an ignition pathway consistent with an accident, rather than resolving the arson issue.
In Work v IAG NZ Ltd [2025] NZSC 171, this case involved a vacant rental property in Wellington. Fire damaged the property. The evidence suggested an electrical arc resulting from contact between live and neutral conductors in a lamp cable, a common occurrence in fires.
The applicants filed a claim under an insurance policy with the respondent IAG New Zealand Ltd.
Isac J of the High Court rejected the applicants’ claim and the first applicant’s evidence that he set up the device as a prank, with no intent to cause a fire. Isac J determined that:
The applicants appealed the High Court ruling. In an interlocutory decision, New Zealand’s Court of Appeal refused to admit new evidence on appeal.
Before the Supreme Court, the applicants applied for leave to appeal. They proposed adding new evidence addressing the question of whether the enlivening of the lamp made nearby combustible material ignite and thus damage the house.
The Supreme Court of New Zealand dismissed the application for leave to appeal and rejected the applicants’ proposal to add supporting evidence upon determining that the proposed new evidence was not fresh.
The Supreme Court acknowledged a dispute between qualified experts regarding the likelihood that arcing might have caused the fire.
The Supreme Court noted that s 74(4) of the Senior Courts Act 2016 stated that it should not grant leave to appeal an appeal court’s interlocutory order unless serving the interests of justice required it to hear the proposed appeal before the appeal court’s determination of the substantive appeal.
The Supreme Court stressed that the appealed decision in this case was interlocutory.
Next, the applicants alleged that admitting their proposed new evidence might determine the crucial issue of arson and would spare them from an entire appeal process, given the relatively minor argument before the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court disagreed. It explained that the proposed new evidence would not necessarily settle the arson issue.
The Supreme Court noted that answering the question of the proposed new evidence’s admissibility would entail placing it in the factual context of other trial evidence and would depend mainly on the cogency of technical expert evidence and an examination of the merits, which the parties disputed in detail.
The Supreme Court added that an appeal before it would lead to much delay in the appeal court’s substantive hearing. The Supreme Court pointed out that this leave application had already resulted in significant and unnecessary delay.
The Supreme Court ordered the applicants to pay the IAG one set of costs of $2,500. However, the Supreme Court declined to award IAG costs against the applicants’ counsel on a personal basis upon finding that his conduct did not meet the high threshold for justifying such an award.
