The legal threshold requires proof of extreme hardship or prejudice to the maintenance of the law
The Court of Appeal dismissed a request for name suppression for a 1984 careless driving conviction, ruling that the appellant’s embarrassment and inconvenience when travelling did not meet the legal threshold to override the principle of open justice.
The appellant, a high-profile professional with significant international commitments, argued that the conviction caused embarrassment and inconvenience when travelling overseas. Although the conviction qualifies under New Zealand’s Clean Slate Act 2004, which limits the impact of minor convictions, it must still be disclosed when entering certain countries, including Australia and the United States.
The original conviction, which resulted in a fine and an order to attend a defensive driving course, has not impeded the appellant's career but has required repeated disclosures during travel. In 2023, the appellant sought to overturn the conviction and applied for suppression of their name and identifying details. The High Court declined the application, finding that the conviction's consequences did not justify such measures.
The Court of Appeal upheld the High Court's decision while granting an extension of time to file the suppression appeal. The court ruled that the legal threshold under section 200 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011, which requires proof of extreme hardship or prejudice to the maintenance of the law, was not met.
The appellant argued that suppression was necessary to preserve the purpose of the Clean Slate Act, but the court rejected this, emphasising that the act does not grant automatic suppression. Instead, it provides a limited regime allowing eligible individuals to avoid disclosure in certain circumstances. The court further highlighted the constitutional importance of open justice, noting that granting suppression would undermine transparency in the judicial process.
While the court acknowledged the embarrassment caused by the disclosure of the conviction, it found this insufficient to outweigh the public interest in openness. It also noted that the appellant’s ability to travel and meet professional obligations remained unaffected.
