Underlying case alleges principal unlawfully terminated student’s enrolment
The Victorian Supreme Court’s Court of Appeal determined that preventing solicitors from acting for the defendants at the present stage would deprive them of their legal representatives, who were familiar with the issues and materials in the case, shortly before the hearing.
In the trial division, Student A and his parents brought a proceeding against a college and its former principal. The plaintiffs alleged that another college student bullied and was physically violent toward Student A, whose enrolment the principal allegedly terminated unlawfully.
The plaintiffs’ claims against the defendants, along with the matters raised in the defence, remained pending and untested, as numerous interlocutory disputes slowed the progress toward trial and led the court to vacate at least one trial date.
The trial judge declined an application to restrain the defendants’ solicitors, McInnes Wilson Lawyers (MWL), and previously retained senior counsel from continuing to act for the defendants.
Before the appeal court, the mother – the applicant in The Mother v Parade College & Ors [2026] VSCA 40 – brought an application for leave to appeal the judge’s decision (the 64A application).
The mother filed another application (the 64B application), which sought seven substantive orders, a number of which concerned MWL’s representation of the defendants.
Among the requested orders, the mother applied for an injunction restraining MWL from acting for the defendants (the 64B restraint application) in connection with the 64A application. She alleged that the court should hear and determine the 64B restraint application before hearing the 64A application.
The Supreme Court of Victoria’s Court of Appeal dismissed the 64B restraint application and ordered the scheduled hearing of the remainder of the 64B application and the 64A application to proceed on 23 March 2026.
The appeal court explained that the 64B restraint application amounted to an application for an interim injunction to prevent MWL from acting until the hearing and determination of the mother’s 64A application. The appeal court refused to grant an interim injunction because the balance of convenience did not favour issuing such relief.
Apart from noting that the trial judge had ruled on the restraint application and that the mother should point to an error in that ruling, the appeal court declined to determine the 64B restraint application’s merits, given the clear overlap between the issues raised in that application and in the 64A application.
The appeal court found the defendants prima facie entitled to the benefit of the judge’s refusal to restrain the defendants’ lawyers from acting, which would stand unless and until overturned on appeal.
The appeal court held that requiring the defendants to engage new representation at short notice would most likely lead to additional delay and unnecessary costs. The appeal court saw no justification for further delaying the hearing and determination of the mother’s application for leave to appeal the judge’s interlocutory orders.
According to the appeal court, as a matter of legal principle, it had inherent and discretionary jurisdiction to stop a solicitor from acting. To exercise that discretion, the appeal court noted that it should consider:
