Sole principal of law practice sought professional fees, disbursements
In a case arising from a request for clients to pay professional fees and disbursements for legal services furnished, the New South Wales Supreme Court’s Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal upon seeing no reasonably clear and relevant injustice.
In Atanaskovic v Birketu Pty Ltd [2025] NSWCA 263, the applicant was the sole principal of a law practice that provided legal services to the first and second respondents.
In 2017, the law practice initiated proceedings against the respondents to seek the payment of professional fees and disbursements in connection with seven invoices, including one dubbed as an ‘investigation invoice.’
In 2019 and 2020, the primary judge issued judgments directing the first and second respondents to pay the applicant and former principals of the law practice $928,982.00 and $14,930.15, representing unpaid fees for legal services.
On 15 May 2020, the judge ordered:
On 12 September 2024, the judge found it inappropriate for the parties to enforce the judgments until the making of a final accounting.
After a High Court ruling in February 2025 concerning the applicant’s cost claim, he attempted to enforce the principal judgments by serving garnishee orders on a debtor of the first and second respondents.
Before the appeal court, the first and second respondents applied to set aside the garnishee orders and stay the principal judgments.
On 28 April 2025, the judge granted the respondents’ requested orders, staying the enforcement of the two judgments issued in the applicant’s favour in 2019 and 2020. The judge decided that the applicant had engaged in ‘sharp practice.’
The applicant applied for leave to appeal the judge’s interlocutory decision. He asserted a reasonably clear injustice going beyond what was merely arguable. He alleged that the judge erred in:
The Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales dismissed the application for leave to appeal with costs. The appeal court ruled that the applicant failed to show any reasonably clear injustice in the primary judge’s decision that went beyond something merely arguable.
First, according to the appeal court, rather than misunderstanding, the judge intended to stay the principal judgments and understood that he should stay the costs orders by operation of statute.
Second, without the misunderstanding alleged in the first ground, the appeal court saw no reviewable error in the judge’s finding of ‘sharp practice.’
The appeal court explained that the judge did not need to address the applicable principles in circumstances where the principles and the circumstances of the litigation were well known and were not the subject of submissions or arguments.
Next, even if the applicant had proven an error, the appeal court held that granting leave would not serve the interests of justice.
The appeal court added that it should neither enable nor encourage the manifestation of the parties’ mutual animus, considering the substantial judicial resources already spent.
The appeal court noted that interest continued to accrue on the judgment amount and that the ruling in Mohareb v Local Court of New South Wales [2024] NSWCA 235, applied.
