A potential roadblock for Lewis Holdings was section 131(2) of the Companies Act, which allows a director of a wholly-owned subsidiary to act in the best interests of the parent company even where this may not be in the best interests of the subsidiary – provided, as was the case here, that this is “expressly permitted” in the subsidiary’s constitution. This is a widely-invoked rule for wholly-owned subsidiaries.
It does not neutralise the effect of section 271. But, while it allows the directors of a subsidiary consciously to prefer the interests of the parent, it does not entitle them to conflate the affairs of the parent and the subsidiary. And the Court found that the STH employees who acted as directors of Stube had not met this standard.
They had not made a distinction between the interests of Stube and the interests of STH and had not structured their decision-making to that end. Instead, they had applied themselves only to the overall interests of the group.
Other factors that influenced the Court were:
- the failure to hold formal board meetings for Stube, as this would have required the directors to sit down and discuss matters “with a conscious appreciation that they were doing so with their Stube directors’ hats on”
- the failure to keep records of, or to charge for the provision of, intra-group services
- the use of STH letterhead to undertake actions in relation to Stube without the employee concerned specifying that he or she was acting for Stube rather than for STH
- the fact that Stube had no separate bank account and that all receipts and payments were accounted for as STH transactions, and
- Stube’s reliance on STH’s in-house counsel for legal advice.
The Court concluded that STH had taken part in the management of Stube “to an extent that was, in essence, total”. Accordingly, it ruled that STH should pay the whole of the claim against Stube.
Josh Blackmore is a partner at Chapman Tripp, specialising in mergers and acquisitions, corporate and securities law.